THE STATE OF CITIES

PALESTINIAN URBANISM IN THE WEST BANK

International Peace and Cooperation Center

Contents

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Overview

The 19th century witnessed the first seeds of modernity under the Ottoman period, the introduction of modern transportation and means of communication in order to connect it with Istanbul: in 1892 a railroad was established between Jerusalem and Jafa Port (to transport pilgrims and goods); wider, more appropriate, roads were built between Jerusalem and Jafa (1870), Nablus (1907) and southwards toward Hebron (via Bethlehem); and in the 1870s telegraph lines connected Jerusalem with Egypt, Beirut, and Istanbul and from there onward to Europe; in addition, various postal services (Ottoman, Russian, German, Austrian, French and Italian) were established (Scholch, 1990: 240).

The British mandate fostered social cultural mobility, new urban elites emerged as a result of turning Jerusalem into the administrative center of the mandate, coastal cities became the gateway to the outside world, Jaffa developed as the economic center during that period, the coastal cities in general were more culturally open than the mountain areas where traditional elites controlled the social order. (Tamari, 2005)

The end of the British Mandate coincided with the declaration of the State of Israel in May 1948. The defeat of the Arab countries' by Israel created the enormous Palestinian tragedy, the An-Nakba (Catastrophe). One of the major impacts of the 1948 war was the loss of the Arab demographic and cultural character of the coastal cities, and loss of the urban culture these cities started to shape; the urban and intellectual elite left historical Palestine to become Diaspora, rejecting the mountains cities which were considered conservative and dominated by traditional families.

After the Nakba mountain cities in the area defined as a West Bank took the lead and introduced different patterns of urbanization, Nablus emerged as an economic and political center. Its economy was based on a feudal land system (with the surrounding villages) and traditional manufacturing. Refugees fled from rural areas, mainly coastal villages between Jaffa and al Majdal (Ashkelon of today), to the Gaza Strip which was under the Egyptian rule and lacked any political economic function. Lack

The West Bank, including East Jerusalem, was annexed to Jordan on 1 December 1948; administrative institutions were transferred from East Jerusalem to Jordan's capital Amman. In 1953 the Hashemites granted East Jerusalem the status of "amana" (trusteeship) and made it the "second capital" of Jordan, but this was primarily in response to the Israeli government's attempt to force international recognition of West Jerusalem as its own capital. Plans to formalize the status by constructing Jordanian government offices were never put into action. The municipal boundaries remained the same as defined in the early 1950's (expanded from 3 km square to 6 km square) and no development budget was allocated for Jerusalem. Jordan devoted its resources to the development and the strengthening of the capital city Amman. Jerusalem was the main core city for the West Bank and most of the economic, political, institutional and cultural functions were located in the city. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 had a major impact on Palestinian cities role, functions and urbanism. Jerusalem continue to develop as a central city and the core of the urbanized area to the Palestinians, the city and its hinterland witnessed a major physical and a functional transformational process, which had an impact on the Palestinian cities and their level of urbanization and spatial interactions.

East Jerusalem restricted core and the lack of urbanism

In addition to these formal political-legal acts, Israel also set in motion a series of policies designed to "create facts on the ground". A two-fold strategy was adopted and implemented with great speed and energy. First, as a means of establishing a strong Jewish physical presence over all of East Jerusalem, a massive program of Jewish settlement was carried out beyond the pre-1967 dividing line. Second, the Israeli authorities sought to maintain--and if possible even enlarge--the Jewish demographic majority by encouraging Jews to settle in Jerusalem, while at the same time restricting the migration of Arabs from the West Bank into the newly annexed areas of East Jerusalem (Romann and Weingrod, 1991).

Following the geopolitical act of annexing East Jerusalem, the Israeli government confiscated more than 30,000 dunums (34% of the East Jerusalem territory) of Palestinian land for the building of new Jewish settlements. Twelve settlements have been built since 1967 in East Jerusalem with a 2005 population of 180,000 (IPCC, 2007). In addition, large tracts of Palestinian private owned land (31,000 dunums, or 7,750 acres) were designated "green areas" through zoning ordinances. As a result of the above policies, Palestinian neighborhoods (built up areas and available land for future development) consisted of only 14% of East Jerusalem. Israel imposed a restricted policy on Palestinian construction and economic development which led to the emigration of the Palestinians from the city to new areas which had developed as suburbs of the city. Between 1982 and 1992 only 270,000 of the 5,000,000 square meters of built-up Jerusalem were designated for Palestinians. (IPCC, 2007)

Jerusalem municipal Palestinian neighborhoods can be classified into the following groupings:

- The Old City with an area of less than 1 square Km

- Neighborhoods developed on villages land where the core village (but not its land) was excluded from Israeli municipal boundaries such as Kafr A`qab, Beit Hanina, and  A`nata.

- Neighborhoods developed as an expansion of core villages annexed to the municipal boundaries or an expansion to the core village. Examples of that would be Silwan, `Isawiya, as Sawahira, Beit Safafa (divided village between 1948-1967) and Sur Bahir.

- Urban neighborhoods from the 19th and early 20th   centuries remained in the Eastern section of the divided city. e.g., Skeikh Jarrah, Wadi al Joz and Bab Assahire. It is worth mentioning that most of the Palestinians lived in urban neighborhood were exiles, as a result of the Al-Nakba in 1948: the elite, middle class and educated groups were forced to leave the urban neighborhoods which later became west Jerusalem. The exiles numbered approximately 30,000 thousand; they had lived in 8 urban neighborhoods and 39 villages; most of the villages were demolished after the war (Amirav, 1992).

Zoning Between Territorial Domination and Restriction

The areas zoned by the Israeli municipality as an open space are colored green (dark and light) on zoning maps. These are areas where construction is totally forbidden. In a neutral planning system this regulation is a requirement to protect the greenery and to keep urban open spaces both on the neighborhood level and on the broader region level. However, in the East Jerusalem case this regulation is meant to restrict Palestinian growth and development and to isolate and "protect" the Israeli settlements. Wide belts of open space and exaggerated "green areas" are imposed on East Jerusalem. Such zones create great fear amongst the Palestinians who plan to build a home only find out that most of their hopes are painted green on the mayor's table. And it should be stressed that these green areas, as far as the Palestinians are concerned, are almost the only land reserved for future development. In most cases these lands are barren, very rocky, and not potential agricultural land.

The Israeli settlements form loop belts that disrupt Palestinian geographic and demographic continuity. The Israeli settlements are established to achieve territorial, demographic, physical and political control, and at the same time to obstruct the development of the Palestinian land. On the other hand, Palestinian areas have been developed by desperate private initiatives of land owners (usually on family land) and small scale contractors, without physical plans, or the support and incentives of the central and local governments, and with only limited financial, technical, and administrative resources. Areas around Palestinian buildup areas designated as green open spaces, i.e. not available for future expansion -- whereas areas around the Jewish settlements are zoned as unplanned, i.e. available for any future proposal for change in the land use (Margalit, 2006:37). Experience shows that the so called "green" Palestinian areas are used as a "reserve" that will later serve the expansion interests of Israeli settlements built in East Jerusalem. In the last decade,

there are at least two cases of the so called green areas being transformed into an area for the development of settlements -- Har Homa which was established in 1996 with a total area of 2,523 dunums and a population of 2,925 by the beginning of 2005) and Rekhes Shu`fat (Ramat Shlomo) which was established in 1994 with a total area of 1,126 dunums and a population of 15 thousant at the beginning of 2009 (Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, 2009/2010).

The restriction of Palestinian development and the exercise of excessive designation of "green area" have affected East Jerusalem and its inhabitants and forced them to migrate towards Jerusalem's outer boundaries. Many Jerusalemites who could not find a residence or space to build in East Jerusalem had to look for housing options outside the municipal line, such as in the Al-Ram area and Al-Ezarieh, which lie in the direct surrounding areas of the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem.

Since the mid-1980s many Palestinians have the city and built their houses in areas outside the municipal boundaries. The scarcity and cost of land in the city is, of course, a major reason for this. By contrast, lands were readily available in areas around Jerusalem and at much more reasonable prices compared to the city. But other significant factors fueling this migration were:

The Israeli restrictions on the construction and development process, particularly the difficulty of obtaining building permits in the city in comparison to the process in areas subject to the Israeli military administration laws in the West Bank, which include the areas surrounding Jerusalem.

The imposition of high construction taxes and municipality fees that cannot be borne by individuals. By contrast, construction initiatives on the Israeli side are undertaken by public parties or by the private sector, which leads to lower fees and taxes.

The difficulty of registering land ownership, since most lands in Jerusalem have not been through parcelization and registration. The social system, family ownership and the inheritance system have been problematic to the registration of lands.

The suburbs around municipal Jerusalem served as a "middle ground" between West Bank towns and the city. They contributed to its expansion and development as a major transportation hub linking the southern West Bank with the north. Too, the suburban area became a new home for institutions and businesses forced to move out of cordoned Jerusalem in order to continue serving their West Bank clientele or to maintain their West Bank employees (Nasrallah, 2006: 378-379).

From Suburbanization to Informal Housing and Urban Deterioration

In 1996, Israeli authorities unintentionally brought a halt to this suburbanization. That year they retroactively applied a new "center of life" policy required that Palestinian Jerusalemites to prove by presenting myriad documents, that their "center of

life" remained within the Israeli municipal boundaries--or risk losing their residency status and the Israeli social benefits package that comes with that status. Palestinian residents were forced to show that they worked in the city, had paid all their property and municipal taxes, and that their children went to schools in Jerusalem (Margalit, 2006; Brooks, 2005). The move was regarded as a direct attempt to steer the development of suburbanization into a favorable outcome in the ongoing Israeli demographic battle by freezing out East Jerusalemites who had migrated to the suburbs. While previously, Israeli regulations had only threatened those living overseas with the loss of Jerusalem residency, the new law effectively considered the growing suburbs as foreign territory. The new regulation caused thousands of suburban Palestinians to panic, pick up their lives, and return to residing inside the municipal boundaries.

The wave of returnees to the city not only stinted suburbanization but also caused an East Jerusalem housing shortage, skyrocketing housing costs, and an overcrowding of serious proportions. Many of those returning from the suburbs moved in with their relatives or endured poor housing conditions; some simply maintained two addresses, one of them inside the city. This return flight not only affected residents, but also businesses. Approximately one third of Ar-Ram's businesses and small manufacturing workshops moved from the suburbs to areas within municipal Jerusalem, particularly to Beit Hanina and the industrial area of Atarot (Brooks, 2007).

More recently, a second wave of returnees has developed. The construction of an Israeli series of walls, fences, barbed wire, patrol roads, and army watchtowers in the Jerusalem area, which began in 2002, is the logical continuation of the policy of severing East Jerusalem from its West Bank hinterlands, and has thus caused a second panicked migration back to the city. The Separation Wall blocks access to the city center through the establishment of permanent checkpoints, which, more often than not, mean long waits and unpredictable travel times. These realities make a daily commute impossible and heighten the need to reside within the city itself. While maintaining an "alibi" address inside the city boundaries was once a pragmatic solution for some commuters, this is no longer a feasible option (Nasrallah, 2006: 378-379).

The lack of zoning and planning and the myriad of Israeli bureaucratic red tape that must be negotiated in order to obtain a building permit has forced those who return to the city to build illegally. The construction of a house even "illegally" ironically granted a legal right to reside in the city: the houses built without permits were registered in the municipal tax record, an essential proof that Jerusalem is the center of life of the owners. Building illegally, of course, risks the investment. Such properties are under threat of demolition by the Israeli authorities. Indeed, 595 unlicensed houses were demolished in the period 1994-2005 (Margalit, 2006:22); in addition, owners have to pay fines for the unlicensed construction. Margalit reports that between 2001 and 2005, 29.6 million US dollars were collected by the Israeli municipality as fines from East Jerusalem Palestinians. (Margalit, 2006:25)

Jerusalem the shrinking city and ending the Centrality

Since Israel occupied East Jerusalem, aside from the termination of their sovereign institutions, the Palestinians have been accorded semi-autonomy in fields related to their lives, such as health and education. Private schools, for example, were not required to adopt an Israeli curricula and continued to employ the Jordanian education scheme taught in the West Bank until it was replaced with Palestinian curricula following establishment of the Palestinian Authority. Admittedly, Israel attempted in the beginning of the 1970s to impose Israeli curricula in public schools but parents refused to send their children to those schools, forcing the Israeli authorities to retreat from their decision. Similarly, Jerusalem preserved its health system after the occupation through the services of Palestinian hospitals, which remained independent from the Israeli Health Ministry. Furthermore, Jordan continued to control the Waqf that administers the Haram Ash-Sharif as well as most properties and real estate in the Old City and some commercial buildings and offices outside the walls in East Jerusalem's commercial-business center along Sultan Suleiman and Salah Eddin Streets (Dumper, 1997).

Palestinian influence and independence in Jerusalem began to strengthen at the end of the 1970s. From the beginning of the 1980s, the process of establishing civil society organizations and service institutions accelerated due to PLO support and financing allocated at the Arab Summit in Baghdad in 1974. Several universities, cultural centers, social services institutions and media centers were established. The Israeli motive behind "allowing" such institutions to exist rested on the false assessment that their existence would lead to the formation of a Palestinian leadership comprised of West Bank and Gaza Strip residents as an alternative to the PLO. However, those institutions effectively formed an arm of the PLO, especially during the First Intifada (1987-1992). Indeed, the role of the PLO increased to the point of replacing the role of the traditional leaderships and weakening Jordan's role in important institutions such as the Waqf Department, syndicates and unions. Those institutions ended their affiliation with Jordan when it declared disengagement from the West Bank in 1988, and the resulting vacuum was filled by the PLO (Dumper, 1997).

The West Bank and Gaza Strip's importance increased following the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987, when the conflict and its leadership moved from "outsiders" (PLO exiles at first in Lebanon, later Tunisia) to the "insiders" (personalities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories). It is possible to state that during this period Jerusalem was transformed into the undeclared capital of the Palestinian territories due to its position as the center of representative political and service institutions, in addition to its commercial centrality and its status as an important metropolitan center for the entire West Bank and, to a lesser extent, the Gaza Strip.

The decision in 1991 to hold an international conference for peace in the Middle East (the Madrid Peace Conference), followed by an agreement on a formula for a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, and the acceptance by the Tunis-based PLO

leadership of a delegation that included insider Jerusalem personalities known for their loyalty to the PLO, transformed Jerusalem into the headquarters of the Palestinian negotiating team. That headquarters became the diplomatic and political address of the Palestinians. (the Orient House building north of the old city)

The year 1992 saw the launch of the so-called Washington talks. They were something of a smoke screen since while they were being conducted, other direct secret negotiations were going on in Oslo between Israelis and official representatives of the PLO from Tunis; the parties succeeded in reaching a Declaration of Principles (DOP) in September 1993. The two sides agreed to include the issue of the future of Jerusalem as one of the final status issues, and accepted the participation of Jerusalemites in the election process for the Self-Governing Authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The DOP stipulated that an agreement on the future of Jerusalem would be reached in the final phase among the issues postponed for this phase, which are the issues of settlements, the refugees, borders and security areas, and water. An agreement over these issues was supposed to be reached within no later than three years from the commencement of the interim (1993 Oslo) phase (Abbas, 1995). This was an important benchmark not only for the seeming agreement to discuss Jerusalem; it also represented a turning point in moving the political weight of the outsiders into the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and weakening the role played by the inside leadership prior to establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) (al-Qaq, 1997).

Agreements to eventually discuss the city notwithstanding, year after year Jerusalem's status declined as the hub of Palestinian life. Firstly, in 1993 Israel imposed a military closure over Jerusalem that all but eliminated its role as a West Bank center: all Palestinians were banned from entering Jerusalem for shopping, working, or receiving services except those who live within the Israeli-defined municipal boundary of the city. Secondly, the consequences of closure on the mobility of West Bankers, and the restrictions on PA operations in the city, have effectively forced the PA to site its national institutions outside of East Jerusalem in Ramallah.

In June 1994, just after Israel signed the Oslo B Accord (May 1994) and the PA was founded, Israel began passing laws barring Palestinian institutions' activities in East Jerusalem, in contravention to its agreement with the PLO. After the Israeli Knesset passed this law in its session on June 26, 1994, Israeli authorities, instructed by Premier Yizhaq Rabin, began curtailing Palestinian activities in Jerusalem, and the Israeli security apparatuses set "criteria" in accordance with which the operations of Palestinian institutions were monitored. Such criteria included the nature of the activity, the activity's governmental character (sovereignty), its linkage to the PA's budget, its affiliation with the official Palestinian administrative system, usage of official titles, and usage of the PA's emblem (Klein, 1999; Cohen, 2007: 56). Israel enforced these regulations, particularly in regards to areas related to sovereignty and the power of the Palestinian police and preventive security services. At the end of 1994, Israel began working on removing from Jerusalem institutions affiliated with the PA, such as the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the Palestinian

Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), and the Palestinian Housing Council (Ju'beh, 2005; 2007).

On the diplomatic level, Israel undertook measures to stop European diplomatic visits to Orient House. Reacting to the European Union's decision that European foreign ministers visiting the region make official visits to Orient House, Israeli Premier Yizhaq Rabin decided not to bar foreign ministers and ministers from visiting Orient House, but he refused to meet with any who did. In light of this decision, it is possible to say that the work of the Orient House was reduced to following up on the issue of Jerusalem, and seeking to keep the issue of Jerusalem and its future on the political agenda—including the agendas of diplomatic visits, which continued at Orient House on the level of consulates in Jerusalem and representative offices to the PA. During the period following the Oslo Accords, the Orient House worked on following up legal issues pertaining to land and real estate confiscation, house demolition, and health, cultural and athletic services, in addition to assisting individual cases and supporting small projects undertaken by institutions in Jerusalem (Ju'beh, 2005; 2007).

After Binyamin Netanyahu won the 1996 election, he continued efforts undertaken earlier by Rabin and Peres concerning curtailing Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem and barring any signs of sovereignty. He worked on solidifying the Israeli annexation and sovereignty in the occupied East Jerusalem through enforcing police presence and opening new police stations, allocating budgets for developing East Jerusalem, and building settlements, especially on Jabal Abu Ghneim (Har Homa). Moreover, Netanyahu took the decision to open the tunnel that passed parallel to the eastern wall of the Haram Ash-Sharif (Klein, 1999).

In spite of the Orient House's diminishing role following the establishment of the PA, its role as Palestinian political representation in Jerusalem remained important both in the political presentation of the issue of Jerusalem and in the existence of an official address. Palestinians came there to resolve their problems and to address their needs. Israel's closure of the Orient House in August 2001 ended any Palestinian political or institutional representation in Jerusalem. (Israel also closed important service institutions at the same time.) Earlier, the death of Faisal Husseini in June 2001 also had the effect of diminishing the role of this institution even before Israeli closed it (Nasralalh, 2005; Ju'beh, 2005; 2007).

The Palestinian Authority's influence and role in Jerusalem has continued to diminish up to the present day. Several institutions closed by Israel have opened alternative offices in Dhahiyat Al Bareed area just outside Jerusalem's municipal borders. But their ability to operate inside the city has remained limited due to Israeli harassments and restrictions on Palestinian operations, whether on the social, service or political levels (Nasralalh, 2005; Ju'beh, 2005; 2007).

The construction of the Separation Wall, which began in 2003 and has not yet been completed, reified the closure policy which began 10 years earlier. The Wall

amputates East Jerusalem from its direct environs, severing the city geographically and functionally from the rest of the West Bank. The route of the Wall, ignoring both the municipal boundary and the 1948 Armistice Line, aims to include as many Settlements and as much open land as possible whilst excluding as many Palestinian neighborhoods as possible, in order to establish a Greater 'Jewish' Metropolitan Jerusalem and rule out any possibility of a divided or shared city between two states.

Urban transformations under the Palestinian Authority

Palestinian cities have witnessed a rapid development since Oslo 1993-4, social, demographic, economic and spatial changes resulted from the political process and the shifting of functional responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian cities differ in their local identity and culture, level of urbanization and social structure. The emergence of Ramallah as a new administrative and economic center affected other cites mainly Jerusalem which became physically isolated from the West Bank and its hinterland. The Israeli closure policy since 1993 and the erection of the Separation Wall stopped Jerusalem from functioning as a metropolitan city for the Palestinians. National institutions, services provision institutions as well as cultural and media ones were forced to leave the city and others left voluntary due to the harsh restriction of entering the city by West Bankers.

Gaza the intermediate center

The Palestinian national leader Yasser Arafat, chose Gaza as its first provincial headquarters, following the Declaration of Principles in September 1993 and the Gaza-Jericho autonomy agreement (1994) and the interim agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza strip (1995). The newly established Palestinian legislative Council held its inaugural session in Gaza in March 1996. Gaza became the administrative center of the Palestinian Authority, and the seat of its executive, parliamentarian authority, a major   infrastructure project implement in Gaza; an international airport opened in 1998 (near Rafah city south of Gaza Strip) and a sea port (north of Gaza city) where the initial phase completed in 2000. (Sharab, 2006)

The West Bank was a secondary administrative center of the PA. It was only in 1996 - when the Oslo B agreement was signed and presidential and parliamentary elections for the West bank and Gaza were held - that sovereign institutions were established in different cities in the West Bank. For example the Ministry of local Government was located in Jericho, Ministry of Economy in Nablus, Ministry of Waqf in the old city of Jerusalem, Ministry of Tourism in Bethlehem. Other ministries were located in Palestinian suburbs adjacent to the Municipal boundary of Jerusalem such as Ar Ram and Dahiyat Al Bareed, due to the assumption that these institutions should be close to East Jerusalem the future capital would

In September 2000, the second Intifada broke out. Most of the PA institution in Gaza was bombarded and severely damaged by Israel. The Israeli policy behind such

actions was to weaken the security and functional ability of the PA, and resulted in the restriction of movement between Gaza and the West Bank. The president and the PA institutions then operated mainly from Ramallah. Ministries and public institution moved from Jerusalem's suburbs and other cities to Ramallah in the belief that Israel would not reoccupy Area A. This created a second administrative center.

After the 2006 elections, Hamas instigated rule in the Gaza strip thereby maintaining Gaza City as an administrative center. Following Hamas's election into office and the resultant conflict in 2007 Israel enacted a blockade banning almost all exports and imports into the region. Consequently the Gaza Strip relied on imports through tunnels under the Egypt border. This dramatically restricted development in the region and the ability of Gaza to function as a metropolitan city, a function that was not made easier by Israel's heavy bombardment of infrastructure during Operation Cast Lead in 2008. Despite establishing a comprehensive system of governance in the region Hamas's label as a terrorist organization by many international bodies has focused diplomatic attention to Ramallah as the main Palestinian administrative center.

Ramallah the emergence of a metropolitan City

Ramallah is a satellite city of Jerusalem 6 kilometers north of the city. Even though it has its own governorate, it is part of Metropolitan Jerusalem and part of sub-metropolitan region of cluster cities, municipally fragmented but serving as a functional and spatial urban unit. Referring to Ramallah today people mix between Ramallah and Al Bireh, a conurbation of two twin towns; the first is Christian and the second is Muslim. Both towns depended on Jerusalem as their services center until they were separated from the city by the Israeli separation wall.

Archaeological excavations provided proof that the city's roots go back 5,000 years as crossroads for travelers and pilgrims heading to Jericho and Jerusalem. Remains were excavated in the city and were dated to the Roman and Byzantine eras in Palestine (64 BC – AD 636). The cycles of eras in the city appear to have been a Canaanite settlement, a Roman site with some 1000 inhabitants, and a similar number of inhabitants in the Islamic era.

However, the foundation of the city of Ramallah is known locally to have taken place in the middle of the 16th century by Rashed Hadadin who had led his small caravan across the arid hills of Jordan to a location not far from Jerusalem, and settled in the midst of prehistoric caves and two Roman villages. On this spot new dwellings were built. At that time he was not aware that he was laying the foundations for a new, promising town in the heart of Palestine called Ramallah.

Hadadin decided to return to his hometown al-Karak shortly after arriving in Ramallah after hearing about the death of his adversary. His five sons, Sabra, Ibrahim, Jiries, Shqeir, and Hassan, made up their minds to stay in Ramallah. They each had several children and, in time, the children's families grew into extended families,

and became the ancestors of today's Ramallah population.

In the early Ottoman times (1516-1918), Ramallah is mentioned as a village in conurbation with two others: Al Bireh and Beitunia. It has always been recorded as a mixed city that housed both Christians and Muslims. In the same century the Ottomans recorded the city as a prosperous agricultural town at the core of other villages that depended on it and its connections to Jerusalem especially that it had become a feeder city for the administrative capital.

Education, Development and Growth

With time Ramallah expanded and grew in various fields. In 1807, the first Greek Orthodox Church was built, and in 1869, the Friends School for Girls opened. In 1875 the Protestants established a school for boys, and in 1891 the Lutheran German Girls School was created.

Numerous other schools were built in Ramallah which offered educational opportunities, English language trainings and attracted students from the region to live and study in town. This helped build networks with Europe and America and Ramallah graduates started to look for economic opportunities abroad. Therefore, both Ramallah and Al Bireh suffered from emigration mainly to the USA since late 19th century that Ramallah/Al Bireh communities were already established in the US, and the money made abroad by the locals was often invested in the city's further development of its education sector.

Ramallah was converted by the Turkish government in 1902 into a city and its district included 30 surrounding towns and villages. Dignitary Ahmad Murad from Jerusalem was appointed the first governor of Ramallah. In 1908 Ramallah became a city, and dignitary Elias Odeh became its first mayor. The municipal council included one representative from each extended family (Ramallah Municipality). Ramallah/ AL Bireh had a few thousand inhabitants by the beginning of the twentieth century that by the year 1912, 5,000 inhabitants were counted.

During the British Mandate in Palestine between 1917 and 1948, significant prosperity and development were brought to Ramallah/Al Bireh. This is especially that the mandatory bureaucracy needed trained staff that speaks both Arabic and English, and Ramallah graduates were readily capable of taking the jobs. In addition the city served as a leisure spot for diplomats and bureaucrats especially with its close location to Jerusalem, its moderate weather, its springs and garden restaurants. Meanwhile, Palestinian emigration increased and the remittance flowed back into the city increasing spending on education, land and real estate.

In 1948, major changes to the urban structure and fabric of both Ramallah and Al Bireh took place especially that it received urban refugees from Loud and Yaffa, as well as rural refugees from the village of Lifta in West Jerusalem, and the villages of Deir Tarif and Beit Nabala east of Ramla. Most of the refugees have settled in

Ramallah, and have played a major role in the economic and social life of the city until today. With the loss of major Palestinian cities (e.g. Haifa, Jaffa and Ramla) to Israeli occupation, the conurbation of Ramallah/Al Bireh became one the largest cities in what was left of Palestine.

Recent developments in Ramallah (After Oslo)

The fragmentation of the Palestinian territories through checkpoints, closure, and road blockades contributed to moving many of the functions to Ramallah. Restriction of movement between Palestinian localities and cities forced many Palestinians to reside in Ramallah. Most of these people work for the PA institutions which are considered the largest employer of 165,000 Palestinians; 60 % of which are in the West Bank and the rest in Gaza. At this period many international organizations moved physically from Jerusalem to Ramallah. This includes UN agencies which kept Jerusalem as their center, while their main operations are run from Ramallah. Today, all banks and companies headquarters are located in Ramallah, some of which moved from other Palestinian cities like Nablus and Hebron.

The PA institutions both in Gaza and Ramallah considered Jerusalem as their permanent address, for this reason, the PA refused to build public institutions and preferred to rent buildings, assuming that at the end of the interim agreement, Jerusalem will be the capital and institutions will be built there. In 2003, however, the PA decided to stop renting offices and to construct its government compound in Ramallah, which is under construction today. Other ministries like the Ministry of finance are already operating from buildings owned by the PA government.

Since 2005, Ramallah witnessed vast development mainly in real estate and services, in addition to economic growth with the hopes to resume negotiations and the continuous international support to the PA in Ramallah. Ramallah emerged as an administrative center for the PA, the metropolitan center for the entire West Bank, and the economic and commercial center of West Bank.

Ramallah Attracting Population and Inner Migration

Conservative estimates indicate that, between 1996 and 2006, 8,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites migrated to Ramallah. This is even with the construction of the Israeli separation wall which separates both cities from each other and complicates access to their city. A recent survey by the International Peace and Cooperation Center in Jerusalem shows that 16.5% of employed Palestinian Jerusalemites cross the wall every day to work in Ramallah, 40% of which are from the upper class. The salaries that Palestinians earn in Ramallah are 24.6% higher than in Jerusalem. Due to this, as well as the fact that Ramallah has been flourishing as the new financial capital with a trendy style of life, Palestinian Jerusalemites from the middle and upper classes are moving to Ramallah where they get better housing, better jobs, higher salaries, a richer social and cultural life, and access to better public facilities.

This is while rural migration from Palestine to Ramallah continues, and the fact that the city started to attract educated Israeli Palestinians as well. Students and young couples move to the city to find a job and experience the open life style. Housing projects and cooperatives, hotels and high rise offices exist in the city today defining its skyline and new restaurants, bars and dance clubs have contributed to the transformation of Ramallah into a vibrant city. These facts cause continuous daily shifts in the built environment of Ramallah, which grew up the main hill towards its twin city Al Bireh causing both cities to become seamless. The greater Ramallah/Al Bireh metropolitan is estimated in 2007 to be home to 140,000 people.

Dealing with Development and Rapid Urbanization

In dealing with the rapid changes that have been taking place in the last decade, Ramallah has followed the following approaches:

Strengthening of inner-town neighborhoods and streets which is the most dominant case in many Arab cities.

- Suburbanization like is the case with Rawabi north of Ramallah

- Growth and expansion to fill the gaps between adjacent cities, which is a less dominant approach than the first two, especially in the case of Jerusalem and its hinterland in Ramallah and the designation of Palestinian territories as areas A, B and C, which left most of the major cities West Bank fragmented and isolated from their hinterland and surroundings.

The first two approaches were the most dominant in the case of Ramallah. Construction in the neighborhoods within both Ramallah and Al Bireh has been intensified and gaps were being filled to provide a supply for both housing and cultural and administrative activities.

Recently, a new approach of suburbanization has taken place when the Minister of Local Government approved in 2009 the master plan for the first planned Palestinian city, *Rawabi*, as a suburb of Ramallah. Bayti, the developer of the project (jointly owned by Qatar government-owned Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment Company and Ramallah-based Massar International) finalized preparations to launch the construction of about 5,000 housing units some 9 km north of Ramallah as a contribution to the improvement of quality of life of the Palestinian population, especially in Ramallah.

The project is an a result of a Public Private Partnership between the PA and the developer Bayti, and is thought to be significant in providing jobs for Palestinians in addition to its main goal of providing affordable housing to alleviate the housing shortage, and supporting the private sector and its contribution to Palestinian economy. The master plan of *Rawabi* aimed at integrating high planning and design principles, sustainable environmental practices, appropriate architectural features,

creative use of public and green spaces, and ease of access considerations (The ultimate ME business source, 2009).

In the same year, the master plan of another new suburb north west of Ramallah, *Al Rayhan*, has been approved. It is an initiative of the Palestinian Investment Fund a government investment arm. The area of the project is 250 dunums with 1,600 planned housing units for which Palestinian buyers will have mortgage access. The costs of this project have reached $500 million.

It is worth mentioning that the Palestinian Investment fund has been implementing a number of large-scale projects in Ramallah with both local and international investment companies, one of which is the *Irsal Center* project whose costs reach $400 million.

Comparative Analysis

National Urban Structure

The West Bank is divided into 11 Governorates each with a corresponding urban centre. These form the backbone of the urban hierarchy. These Governorate capitals range in size from 10,000 persons to nearly 400,000. Running from north to south, The five major cities; Nablus, Ramallah, East Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron, sit atop the West Banks central mountain ridge, running north to south. Nablus and Hebron, are located at the northern and southern poles and Ramallah, East Jerusalem and Bethlehem conjoin in the centre forming an almost contiguous urban core.

All of West Bank's major urban centres are relatively self contained in that they host their own hospitals, higher educational facilities, and employment opportunities. The main cities offer a wider choice and more specialised facilities.

Urban Core:

Governmental offices, the majority of religious and cultural attractions for tourists and worshipers, the majority of civil society organisations, and the majority of company head-quarters. the greatest employment opportunities.

Nablus:

Finance capital, stock market, soap factories.

Hebron:

Trading, and import export businesses. Its southern location near the West Bank/Gaza Strip transport route suppers this function.

Connectivity

Since the 1993 OSLO Accords administration of the West Bank has been divided between three zones, A, B and C. All Palestinian cities are surrounded by Area C, where Israel maintains full administrative and security control under the guidance of military law.

As such there is no contiguous area of Palestinian Authority control between any of the West Bank's major urban centres. Commuting or transporting between them requires traversing Israeli controlled areas. As a result Palestinian cities are not even connected through a adequate road system let alone rail. Commuting between Nablus and Ramallah, a distance of xx, typically takes XX minutes via the local bus system.

Restrictions were much more severe during the second intifada, when entire cities were placed on 'lock down'. Between 2000 and 2005 the majority of residents of Nablus were unable to leave the city. While travel restrictions has been eased in recent years and the number of checkpoint reduced, the West Bank's inter city transport networks remain inadequate.

More damaging than the intercity restrictions are those imposed on international flows. The flow of both goods and people is controlled by Israeli ports. The addition delays and fees this incurs has impeded the West Bank's export industry. The denial and restricted allocation of visas have limited cities' ability to import international labour and tourism, particularly from other Arab and Muslim states residents of which are typically denied entry.

The rise of the internet over the last two decades has enabled certain level of connectivity transcending physical barriers. Its importance to the life and vitality Palestinian cities considering the extent of isolation at global, regional and even national levels.

The largest and in many ways most physically 'connected' city is East Jerusalem which as a result of annexation by Israel in the 1967 is now integrated into Israel proper. This includes connection with Israel's other cities via trains and unobstruct-ed road networks as well as and to Ben Gurion international airport. However, East Jerusalem suffers from both internal barriers and physical isolation from the West Bank. While the most connected other cities through Israeli infrastructure, it by far the most fragmented West Bank city. East Jerusalem's internal divisions between individual neighbourhoods are similar to those experienced between West Bank cities, but more intensively on a smaller scale. The main city is physically cut off from its West Bank hinterlands by the Separation Wall. Neighbourhoods on either side of the Wall are further partitioned by Israeli Settlements (statistical footnote). Development within neighbourhoods on the ISrael side of the Wall has been kept to a minimum by Israeli planning policy which has sought to maintain a Jewish demographic majority. As a result, East Jerusalem functions as a series of largely residential neighbourhoods. The majority of its resents work in either West Jerusalem, Israeli Settlements or Ramallah.

Aside from its places of worship, which will always have global significance, it is home to very few of the political or economic, or even cultural, institutions usually associated with a capital city. Following Israel's closure policy, many of the most important political and economic institutions have moved to Ramallah. UN offices, and a handful of diplomatic remain and have created a demand for highly specialised labour that is attracted.

Regional

West Bank's cities are small compared to regional centres. Amman, Beirut and Damascus all support populations of between 1.5-2 million. These three cities act in a regional and global scale beyond that of any West Bank city. Tel Aviv has a relatively small population of 400,000 yet is in many ways a global city. While their relatively small size does add limitations to their global reach the primary restraint is their severely restricted connectivity.

The most fluid international network is with Jordan and its capital city Amman. In many ways, the five main West Bank cities function as satellite centres to Amman. West Bank Palestinians use Amman for its airport, universities, shopping malls, and in rare cases hospitals. Besides the international border crossing very little differentiates Jordan from the West Bank. All West Bank Palestinians are granted Jordanian passports. Moreover, Jordan is home to largest number of Palestinian refugees now estimated to constitute over 60% of the population.

Urban Centers > 100,000

Cairo	8000000
Alexandria	4300000
Giza	3000000
Amman	2200000
Az Zarqa	1600000
Beirut	1500000
Damascus	1700000
Shubra El-Khaima	600000
Port Said	600000
Irbid	600000
Suez	550000
West Jerusalem	550000
Gaza	450000
Tel Aviv	400000
East Jerusalem	300000
Nablus	170000
Hebron	180000
Khan Younis	160000
xxx	
xxxx	
xxx	

12 Governorate Capitals

Jenin
Jenin Camp

Tubas

Tulkarem
Tulkarm Camp

Nablus
Balata Camp
'Askar Camp

Qalqiliya

Salfit

Ramallah
Al Bireh
Al Am'ari Camp
Beituniya
Qaddura Camp

Jericho

East Jerusalem (outer)
'Anata
Qalandiya Camp
Ar Ram & Dahiyat al Bareed
Jaba'
Al Judeira
Bir Nabala
Al Jib
Abu Dis
Al 'Eizariya

East Jerusalem (inner)
Old City
Kafr Aqab
Beit Hanina + Shu'fat
Shu'afat Refugee Camp + Anata
Issawiyya
At-Tur / As Sawana
Wadi al Joz, Sheikh Jarrah
Silwan + Ras al Amud + Wadi Qadum + Abu Tor
Jabal Mukabber + As Sawahra
Sur Bahir + Umm Tuba
Beit Safafa + Sharafat

Hebron

Population Scale

10,000
100,000
300,000

Physical Indicators

	AREA	DENSITY	MUNICIPAL AREA
	sqkm	persons / 1000sqm	sqkm
Hebron	29.5	6.4	9.3
East Jerusalem (Inner)	15.8	6.6	10.1
Ramallah	14.6	12.0	11.7
Nablus	14.4	6.4	7.4
Bethlehem	10.2	7.7	7.9
East Jerusalem (Outer)	9.4	32.1	
Tulkarm	9.0	8.6	7.4
Jenin	6.6	8.4	7.5
Qalqiliya	3.9	12.1	8.0
Jericho	2.8	7.3	5.4
Tubas	2.5	7.5	6.1
Salfit	2.0	4.8	5.5

Salfit

Jericho

Nablus

Qalqiliya

Jenin

Hebron

Tubas

Bethlehem

Tulkarem

Ramallah

East Jerusalem

Density

DENSITY (persons per 1000sqm)

0   10   20   30   40   50   60   70

Hebron

East Jerusalem (Inner)

Ramallah

Nablus

Bethlehem

East Jerusalem (Outer)

Tulkarm

Jenin

Qalqiliya

Jericho

Tubas

Salfit

scale: 300000 persons

Salfit

Jericho

Nablus

Qalqiliya

Jenin

Hebron

Tubas

Bethlehem

Tulkarem

Ramallah

East Jerusalem

Israeli control

Qalqiliya

Jenin

Hebron

Salfit

Jericho

Nablus

% of built-up area un israeli control

Tulkarem

Ramallah

Tubas

Bethlehem

East Jerusalem (outer)

East Jerusalem (inner)

scale:
300,000
persons

Gov. Capitals

Localities

50   500   5000   50000   500000   Persons (log)

1   2   4   8   16   32   64   % (log)

20   25   30   35   40   45   50   55   60   %

Demographic Indicators

Population Size

1.	East Jerusalem (Inner)	301204
2.	Hebron	189444
3.	Nablus	174235
4.	Ramallah	104647
5.	Bethlehem	92034
6.	East Jerusalem (Outer)	78365
7.	Tulkarm	77490
8.	Jenin	55511
9.	Qalqiliya	46970
10.	Jericho	20826
11.	Tubas	18830
12.	Salfit	9763

Average Annual Population Growth 1997-2007

1.	Ramallah	4.2
2.	Tulkarm	3.2
3.	Tubas	3.2
4.	Hebron	3.2
5.	Jenin	3.2
6.	East Jerusalem (Inner)	3.0
7.	Qalqiliya	2.8
8.	Nablus	2.2
9.	Salfit	2.2
10.	Bethlehem	1.9
11.	East Jerusalem (Outer)	1.9
12.	Jericho	1.7

Proportion of persons <15 years

1.	Hebron	44.0
2.	East Jerusalem (Inner)	41.2
3.	Qalqiliya	40.9
4.	Jenin	39.0
5.	Tubas	38.8
6.	Tulkarm	38.6
7.	Nablus	38.2
8.	Salfit	37.2
9.	Jericho	37.0
10.	Bethlehem	35.4
11.	Ramallah	35.0
12.	East Jerusalem (Outer)	32.3

scale: 300,000 persons

● Gov. Capitals

● Localities

0.0   5.0   10.0   15.0   20.0   25.0   30.0 %

4   4.5   5   5.5   6   6.5   7   7.5   8 %

0.0   5.0   10.0   15.0   20.0   25.0   30.0   35.0   40.0 %

Social Indicators

Proportion of population (>10 years) with higher education

1.	Ramallah	26.2
2.	Salfit	17.3
3.	Nablus	16.7
4.	Bethlehem	16.2
5.	Tulkarm	14.4
6.	Tubas	14.1
7.	Jenin	13.7
8.	Jericho	12.3
9.	East Jerusalem (Outer)	10.8
10.	Qalqiliya	10.5
11.	Hebron	10.0

Average Household Size

1.	Hebron	5.7
2.	Tubas	5.5
3.	Qalqiliya	5.3
4.	Tulkarm	5.3
5.	Jericho	5.2
6.	East Jerusalem (Outer)	5.2
7.	Jenin	5.1
8.	Nablus	5.1
9.	East Jerusalem (Inner)	5.1
10.	Bethlehem	4.9
11.	Ramallah	4.8
12.	Salfit	4.8

Proportion of women in work force

1.	Ramallah	22.2
2.	Salfit	18.5
3.	Jericho	16.5
4.	Bethlehem	16.1
5.	Nablus	13.6
6.	Tubas	13.3
7.	East Jerusalem (Inner)	12.6
8.	Tulkarm	12.3
9.	Jenin	12.1
10.	East Jerusalem (Outer)	9.4
11.	Qalqiliya	9.2
12.	Hebron	7.7

Economic Indicators

	AVG. HOUSEHOLD MONTHLY EXPENDITURE JD	AVG. RENTS JD	UNEMPLOYMENT %	HOUSEHOLD CAR OWNERSHIP %	ESTABLISHMENTS	ESTABLISHMENTS per 1000 persons	EMPLOYMEES	EMPLOYEES per 100 persons
East Jerusalem (Inner)	1460.9	204.5	11.6	12				
East Jerusalem (Outer)			16.6	24.3	2674	34.1	7629	9.7
Ramallah	10	10	7.6	42.4	10	57.1	10	28.6
Nablus	1075.1	103.9	12.0	27.3	8543	49.0	25032	14.4
Salfit	981.4	89.6	12.8	24.5	436	44.7	961	9.8
Qalqiliya	981.4	89.6	15.9	17.8	1925	41.0	4468	9.5
Tulkarm	868.4	81	15.8	20.5	3394	43.8	8619	11.1
Hebron	805.3	79.2	11.1	26.3	7364	38.9	24371	12.9
Bethlehem	792.7	119.5	12.9	36.7	4064	44.2	13996	15.2
Jenin	769.9	74.3	14.5	22.4	3362	60.6	7744	14.0
Tubas	715.6	75.6	13.0	21.5	699	37.1	1363	7.2
Jericho	715.6	75.6	8.5	27.6	668	32.1	2185	10.5

City
Profiles

Built-Up Area

Jericho
Palestinian
Israeli Settlement

Zones

A
B
C
Military

Boundary

Municipality
Governorate
Country
Separation Wall

Bethlehem

URBAN INDICATORS[1]
Built-up Area	14.40 sqkm
Locality Type	GovCapital

DEMOGRAPHY
Population	81,317 persons
Population Density	5,649 persons per sqkm
Population Growth (net)	1.95 % per annum (1997-2007)
Age Dependency Ratio	0.70
Young (<15yrs)	35.43 %
Old (>65yrs)	4.56 %

EDUCATION
Illiteracy Rate	
Total	3.88 %
Male	2.67 %
Female	5.66 %
Higher Education Rate	
Total	16.20 %
Male	14.35 %
Female	15.58 %

HOUSING
Household Size	15.6 persons per household
House Type:	
House	18.6 %
Apartment	79.9 %
Other (inc. tents)	1.6 %
Building Use:	
Habitation	62.0 %
Vacant	6.7 %

ECONOMY
Establishments	4064
Employees	13996
Unemployment	12.9 %
Men in Work Force	57.6 %
Women in Work Force	16.1 %
Household Car Ownership	229.1 %

INFRASTRUCTURE
Water Network	97.1 % connected
Electricity Network	98.9 % connected
Sewage Network	80.5 % connected

SETTLEMENTS[2]
Settlements within 10km	19
Nearest Settlement	Har Gilo (3.6km)

CASUALTIES (2000-2010)[3]
as a direct result of the conflict:
Injuries	132
Deaths	15

East Jerusalem (outer)

URBAN INDICATORS[1]
Built-up Area	14.36 sqkm
Locality Type	0

DEMOGRAPHY
Population	96,369 persons
Population Density	6,710 persons per sqkm
Population Growth (net)	1.26 % per annum (1997-2007)
Age Dependency Ratio	0.77
Young (<15yrs)	34.36 %
Old (>65yrs)	2.58 %

EDUCATION
Illiteracy Rate	
Total	4.97 %
Male	2.71 %
Female	7.30 %
Higher Education Rate	
Total	9.91 %
Male	9.96 %
Female	9.85 %

HOUSING
Household Size	5.3 persons per household
House Type:	
House	26.9 %
Apartment	66.0 %
Other (inc. tents)	7.1 %
Building Use:	
Habitation	66.9 %
Vacant	9.0 %

ECONOMY
Establishments	3275
Employees	8927
Unemployment	18.2 %
Men in Work Force	58.2 %
Women in Work Force	9.0 %
Household Car Ownership	349.8 %

INFRASTRUCTURE
Water Network	91.1 % connected
Electricity Network	93.9 % connected
Sewage Network	36.8 % connected

SETTLEMENTS[2]
Settlements within 10km	9
Nearest Settlement	Keidar (4.8km)

CASUALTIES (2000-2010)[3]
as a direct result of the conflict:
Injuries	87
Deaths	7

East Jerusalem (inner)

URBAN INDICATORS[1]
Built-up Area	14.36 sqkm
Locality Type	0

DEMOGRAPHY
Population	96,369 persons
Population Density	6,710 persons per sqkm
Population Growth (net)	1.26 % per annum (1997-2007)
Age Dependency Ratio	0.77
Young (<15yrs)	34.36 %
Old (>65yrs)	2.58 %

EDUCATION
|	
Illiteracy Rate	
Total	4.97 %
Male	2.71 %
Female	7.30 %
Higher Education Rate	
Total	9.91 %
Male	9.96 %
Female	9.85 %

HOUSING
Household Size	5.3 persons per household
House Type:	
House	26.9 %
Apartment	66.0 %
Other (inc. tents)	7.1 %
Building Use:	
Habitation	66.9 %
Vacant	9.0 %

ECONOMY
Establishments	3275
Employees	8927
Unemployment	18.2 %
Men in Work Force	58.2 %
Women in Work Force	9.0 %
Household Car Ownership	349.8 %

INFRASTRUCTURE
Water Network	91.1 % connected
Electricity Network	93.9 % connected
Sewage Network	36.8 % connected

SETTLEMENTS[2]
|	
Settlements within 10km	9
Nearest Settlement	Keidar (4.8km)

CASUALTIES (2000-2010)[3]
as a direct result of the conflict:
Injuries	87
Deaths	7

Sources:
1. OCHA GIS Map Data
2. PeaceNow (2009)
3. OCHA Casualty Data (2000-2010)
All other data from PCBS Censuses 1997 & 2007

Hebron

URBAN INDICATORS[1]

Built-up Area   29.49 sqkm
Locality Type   GovCapital

DEMOGRAPHY

Population   persons
Population Density   5,532 persons per sqkm
Population Growth (net) 3.17 % per annum (1997-2007)
Age Dependency Ratio   0.90
Young (<15yrs)   44.01 %
Old (>65yrs)   2.38 %

EDUCATION

Illiteracy Rate
  Total   3.84 %
  Male   2.61 %
  Female   5.17 %
Higher Education Rate
  Total   9.95 %
  Male   9.90 %
  Female   10.02 %

HOUSING

Household Size   5.7 persons per household
House Type:
  House   25.8 %
  Apartment   73.2 %
  Other (inc. tents)   0.9 %
Building Use:
  Habitation   67.2 %
  Vacant   3.8 %

ECONOMY

Establishments   7364
Employees   24371
Unemployment   11.1 %
Men in Work Force   59.3 %
Women in Work Force   7.7 %
Household Car Ownership 26.3 %

INFRASTRUCTURE

Water Network   83.3 % connected
Electricity Network   99.2 % connected
Sewage Network   82.1 % connected

SETTLEMENTS[2]

Settlements within 10km   8
Nearest Settlement   Kiryat Arba (2.7km)

CASUALTIES (2000-2010)[3]

as a direct result of the conflict:
  Injuries   552
  Deaths   20

Sources:
1. OCHA GIS Map Data
2. PeaceNow (2009)
3. OCHA Casualty Data (2000-2010)
All other data from PCBS Censuses 1997 & 2007

Jenin

URBAN INDICATORS[1]
Built-up Area   6.63 sqkm
Locality Type   GovCapital

DEMOGRAPHY
Population   49,375 persons
Population Density   7,449 persons per sqkm
Population Growth (net)   3.16 % per annum (1997-2007)
Age Dependency Ratio   0.75
Young (<15yrs)   39.03 %
Old (>65yrs)   3.44 %

y-axis: % > 65 yrs (0 to 10)
x-axis: % < 15 yrs (20 to 60)

EDUCATION
Illiteracy Rate
  Total   4.73 %
  Male   2.03 %
  Female   6.55 %
Higher Education Rate
  Total   13.72 %
  Male   15.49 %
  Female   14.12 %

y-axis: % Graduates (0 to 30)
x-axis: % Illiterate (0 to 30)

HOUSING
Household Size   6.5 persons per household
House Type:
  House   26.4 %
  Apartment   72.1 %
  Other (inc. tents)   1.5 %
Building Use:
  Habitation   69.1 %
  Vacant   3.9 %

ECONOMY
Establishments   3362
Employees   7744
Unemployment   14.5 %
Men in Work Force   56.9 %
Women in Work Force   12.1 %
Household Car Ownership   36.7 %

y-axis: % Women in Work Force (0 to 40)
x-axis: % Unemployment (0 to 60)

INFRASTRUCTURE
Water Network   88.7 % connected
Electricity Network   98.9 % connected
Sewage Network   73.1 % connected

SETTLEMENTS[2]
Settlements within 10km   0
Nearest Settlement   Hinanit (12.2km)

CASUALTIES (2000-2010)[3]
as a direct result of the conflict:
  Injuries   160
  Deaths   41

Sources:
1. OCHA GIS Map Data
2. PeaceNow (2009)
3. OCHA Casualty Data (2000-2010)
All other data from PCBS Censuses 1997 & 2007

Jericho

URBAN INDICATORS[1]

Built-up Area   2.85 sqkm
Locality Type   GovCapital

DEMOGRAPHY

Population   18,346 persons
Population Density   6,440 persons per sqkm
Population Growth (net)   1.74 % per annum (1997-2007)
Age Dependency Ratio   0.72
Young (<15yrs)   37.02 %
Old (>65yrs)   3.22 %

EDUCATION

Illiteracy Rate
  Total   4.80 %
  Male   2.69 %
  Female   6.89 %
Higher Education Rate
  Total   12.27 %
  Male   11.60 %
  Female   12.93 %

HOUSING

Household Size   5.2 persons
House Type:
  House   41.8 %
  Apartment   53.9 %
  Other (inc. tents)   4.3 %
Building Use:
  Habitation   67.0 %
  Vacant   6.7 %

ECONOMY

Establishments   668
Employees   2185
Unemployment   8.5 %
Men in Work Force   61.1 %
Women in Work Force   16.5 %
Household Car Ownership   27.6 %

INFRASTRUCTURE

Water Network   95.9 % connected
Electricity Network   95.8 % connected
Sewage Network   6.1 % connected

SETTLEMENTS[2]

Settlements within 10km   9
Nearest Settlement   Vered Yericho (4.8km)

CASUALTIES (2000-2010)[3]

as a direct result of the conflict:
  Injuries   37
  Deaths   4

Sources:
1. OCHA GIS Map Data
2. PeaceNow (2009)
3. OCHA Casualty Data (2000-2010)
All other data from PCBS Censuses 1997 & 2007

Nablus

URBAN INDICATORS[1]

Built-up Area	14.55 sqkm
Locality Type	Refugee Camp

DEMOGRAPHY

Population	persons
Population Density	10,787 persons per sqkm
Population Growth (net)	2.17 % per annum (1997-2007)
Age Dependency Ratio	0.80
Young (<15yrs)	38.19 %
Old (>65yrs)	3.87 %

EDUCATION

|	
Illiteracy Rate	
Total	3.49 %
Male	2.53 %
Female	8.02 %
Higher Education Rate	
Total	16.71 %
Male	6.37 %
Female	7.31 %

HOUSING

Household Size	204.1 persons
House Type:	
House	22.1 %
Apartment	77.1 %
Other (inc. tents)	0.8 %
Building Use:	
Habitation	80.0 %
Vacant	2.5 %

ECONOMY

Establishments	8543
Employees	25032
Unemployment	12.0 %
Men in Work Force	60.1 %
Women in Work Force	13.6 %
Household Car Ownership	48.0 %

INFRASTRUCTURE

Water Network	99.7 % connected
Electricity Network	99.9 % connected
Sewage Network	97.7 % connected

SETTLEMENTS[2]

|	
Settlements within 10km	14
Nearest Settlement	Bracha A (4.2km)

CASUALTIES (2000-2010)[3]

as a direct result of the conflict:

Injuries	772
Deaths	119

Qalqiliya

URBAN INDICATORS[1]

Built-up Area   3.88 sqkm
Locality Type   GovCapital

DEMOGRAPHY

Population	41,739 persons
Population Density	10,766 persons per sqkm
Population Growth (net)	2.77 % per annum (1997-2007)
Age Dependency Ratio	0.79
Young (<15yrs)	40.87 %
Old (>65yrs)	2.72 %

EDUCATION

Illiteracy Rate	
Total	4.68 %
Male	2.28 %
Female	7.19 %
Higher Education Rate	
Total	10.52 %
Male	11.12 %
Female	9.89 %

HOUSING

Household Size	5.3 persons
House Type:	
House	27.4 %
Apartment	71.9 %
Other (inc. tents)	0.7 %
Building Use:	
Habitation	65.8 %
Vacant	3.7 %

ECONOMY

Establishments	1925
Employees	4468
Unemployment	15.9 %
Men in Work Force	55.7 %
Women in Work Force	9.2 %
Household Car Ownership	17.8 %

INFRASTRUCTURE

Water Network	99.5 % connected
Electricity Network	99.6 % connected
Sewage Network	98.7 % connected

SETTLEMENTS[2]

Settlements within 10km	8
Nearest Settlement	Tzofim (3.6km)

CASUALTIES (2000-2010)[3]

as a direct result of the conflict:

Injuries	131
Deaths	20

Sources:
1. OCHA GIS Map Data
2. PeaceNow (2009)
3. OCHA Casualty Data (2000-2010)
All other data from PCBS Censuses 1997 & 2007

Ramallah

URBAN INDICATORS[1]

|	
Built-up Area	15.84 sqkm
Locality Type	Main

DEMOGRAPHY

Population	91,645 persons
Population Density	5,785 persons per sqkm
Population Growth (net)	4.24 % per annum (1997-2007)
Age Dependency Ratio	0.69
Young (<15yrs)	35.03 %
Old (>65yrs)	3.47 %

EDUCATION

Illiteracy Rate	
Total	3.46 %
Male	1.66 %
Female	5.58 %
Higher Education Rate	
Total	26.15 %
Male	28.54 %
Female	26.43 %

HOUSING

Household Size	11.6 persons
House Type:	
House	13.7 %
Apartment	84.2 %
Other (inc. tents)	2.1 %
Building Use:	
Habitation	63.3 %
Vacant	4.8 %

ECONOMY

Establishments	5974
Employees	29901
Unemployment	7.6 %
Men in Work Force	59.7 %
Women in Work Force	22.2 %
Household Car Ownership	160.0 %

INFRASTRUCTURE

Water Network	97.7 % connected
Electricity Network	97.9 % connected
Sewage Network	67.5 % connected

SETTLEMENTS[2]

Settlements within 10km	29
Nearest Settlement	Psagot (2km)

CASUALTIES (2000-2010)[3]

as a direct result of the conflict:

Injuries	234
Deaths	26

Salfit

URBAN INDICATORS[1]

|	
Built-up Area	2.02 sqkm
Locality Type	GovCapital

DEMOGRAPHY

Population	8,796 persons
Population Density	4,346 persons per sqkm
Population Growth (net)	2.16 % per annum (1997-2007)
Age Dependency Ratio	0.71
Young (<15yrs)	37.18 %
Old (>65yrs)	4.19 %

EDUCATION

Illiteracy Rate	
Total	5.64 %
Male	2.43 %
Female	8.81 %
Higher Education Rate	
Total	17.29 %
Male	17.64 %
Female	16.95 %

HOUSING

Household Size	4.8 persons
House Type:	
House	43.5 %
Apartment	55.9 %
Other (inc. tents)	0.7 %
Building Use:	
Habitation	71.3 %
Vacant	3.4 %

ECONOMY

Establishments	436
Employees	961
Unemployment	12.8 %
Men in Work Force	58.8 %
Women in Work Force	18.5 %
Household Car Ownership	24.5 %

INFRASTRUCTURE

Water Network	99.4 % connected
Electricity Network	99.0 % connected
Sewage Network	57.1 % connected

SETTLEMENTS[2]

Settlements within 10km	25
Nearest Settlement	Ariel (2.3km)

CASUALTIES (2000-2010)[3]

as a direct result of the conflict:

|	
Injuries	2
Deaths	1

Tubas

URBAN INDICATORS[1]
Built-up Area   2.50 sqkm
Locality Type   GovCapital

DEMOGRAPHY
Population   16,154 persons
Population Density   6,457 persons per sqkm
Population Growth (net)   3.22 % per annum (1997-2007)
Age Dependency Ratio   0.78
Young (<15yrs)   38.79 %
Old (>65yrs)   4.46 %

EDUCATION
Illiteracy Rate
  Total   7.51 %
  Male   3.06 %
  Female   11.99 %
Higher Education Rate
  Total   14.14 %
  Male   15.83 %
  Female   12.44 %

## HOUSING
Household Size   5.5 persons
House Type:
  House   47.4 %
  Apartment   50.6 %
  Other (inc. tents)   2.0 %
Building Use:
  Habitation   67.8 %
  Vacant   3.7 %

ECONOMY
Establishments   699
Employees   1363
Unemployment   13.0 %
Men in Work Force   57.2 %
Women in Work Force   13.3 %
Household Car Ownership   21.5 %

INFRASTRUCTURE
Water Network   92.0 % connected
Electricity Network   98.2 % connected
Sewage Network   0.0 % connected

SETTLEMENTS[2]
Settlements within 10km   0
Nearest Settlement   Elon More (10.4km)

CASUALTIES (2000-2010)[3]
as a direct result of the conflict:
  Injuries   52
  Deaths   2

Sources:
1. OCHA GIS Map Data
2. PeaceNow (2009)
3. OCHA Casualty Data (2000-2010)
All other data from PCBS Censuses 1997 & 2007

Tulkarem

URBAN INDICATORS[1]

Built-up Area   9.00 sqkm
Locality Type   Refugee Camp

DEMOGRAPHY

Population   71,085 persons
Population Density   7,899 persons per sqkm
Population Growth (net)   3.24 % per annum (1997-2007)
Age Dependency Ratio   0.80
Young (<15yrs)   38.56 %
Old (>65yrs)   3.57 %

EDUCATION

Illiteracy Rate
  Total   4.64 %
  Male   3.75 %
  Female   10.91 %
Higher Education Rate
  Total   14.41 %
  Male   6.25 %
  Female   8.26 %

## HOUSING

Household Size   36.2 persons
House Type:
  House   26.3 %
  Apartment   73.5 %
  Other (inc. tents)   0.1 %
Building Use:
  Habitation   79.7 %
  Vacant   1.1 %

ECONOMY

Establishments   3394
Employees   8619
Unemployment   15.8 %
Men in Work Force   55.8 %
Women in Work Force   12.3 %
Household Car Ownership   67.7 %

INFRASTRUCTURE

Water Network   98.9 % connected
Electricity Network   99.1 % connected
Sewage Network   78.0 % connected

SETTLEMENTS[2]

Settlements within 10km   5
Nearest Settlement   Avnei Hefetz (4.8km)

CASUALTIES (2000-2010)[3]

as a direct result of the conflict:
  Injuries   0
  Deaths   0

Sources:
1. OCHA GIS Map Data
2. PeaceNow (2009)
3. OCHA Casualty Data (2000-2010)
All other data from PCBS Censuses 1997 & 2007